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RECENT DECISIONS
IMPLIED WARRANTY-PRIVlTY OF CONTRACT-Absence of privity of con-
tract between an automobile manufacturer and the ultimate purchaser and
execution of a written warranty agreement between manufacturer and
retailer disclaiming any implied warranty of fitness does not preclude
recovery of damages by the ultimate purchaser from the manufacturer for
breach of implied warranty of fitness.
Manheim v. Ford Motor Co., 201 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 1967).
Retailer sold new Lincoln Continental automobiles which were warranted
by Ford Motor Company's advertisements in magazines, newspapers,
television and brochures as being constructed of quality materials and
with excellent workmanship. Moreover, the Lincoln Continental retailer
orally warranted to appellant, the ultimate purchaser, that a particular
Lincoln Continental convertible was the finest in the world; made with
perfection, and without defective parts. The retailer stated that the car
was suitable for use as a motor vehicle and would be trouble-free for
thousands of miles. Appellant, relying upon these warranties of the
retailer and Ford Motor Company, purchased the particular Lincoln
Continental convertible. Thereafter continuous corrections and repairs
failed to make the automobile useful as a motor vehicle and the appellant
alleged that Ford Motor Company breached an implied warranty of fitness
and suitability. Ford Motor Company never authorized the retailer to
warrant the Lincoln Continental automobiles as the manufacturer's
agent, but did expressly warrant to the retailer that each vehicle was free
under normal use from defects in material and workmanship. The war-
ranty concluded with these words:
This warranty is expressly in lieu of any other express or implied
warranty, including any implied warranty of merchantability or
fitness and of any other obligation on the part of the Company,
except such obligation as the Company may have assumed in its
warranty and Policy manual or other separate written agree-
ment.'
The trial court granted motion for summary judgment in favor of the
manufacturer since there was no privity of contract between the auto-
mobile manufacturer and the ultimate purchaser, and also because of the
written warranty agreement between manufacturer and retailer disclaim-
ing any implied warranty of fitness. The purchaser appealed and the
District Court of Appeals for the Third District of Florida affirmed2 the
decision. The Supreme Court of Florida quashed3 the affirmance with
directions that the purchaser was not precluded recovery from the manu-
1. Manheim v. Ford Motor Co., 201 So. 2d 440, 441 (Fla. 1967).
2. 194 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
3. 201 So. 2d at 443.
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facturer on the basis of an implied warranty of fitness and suitability
made by the manufacturer to the buyer.
The opinion, written by Justice Ervin,4 indicated that the manufacturer
of a product which has been found to be unsuitable for use should be
liable for resulting commercial loss to the ultimate purchaser even though
there was no direct contractual relations between the purchaser and the
manufacturer. Such liability will arise where the purchaser has relied on
the manufacturer's brochures and representations made through the
advertising media. Generally courts have declined to allow recovery
where no accidental or tangible damage has occurred and the only loss
was pecuniary expense in repairing or replacing the defective parts to
prevent an accident.' The court in the instant case, however, believed
that recovery must also be allowed where the only loss sustained is
pecuniary expense in repairing or replacing the defective parts.6
While courts in other states have held the manufacturer liable without
privity of contract only when there was physical injury, a few recent
cases' have held the manufacturer liable without privity of contract when
there was no physical injury, but only a commercial loss resulting from
defectively manufactured products. The rationale of these decisions is
that commerce is no longer conducted by contracts alone, but rather by
advertising, upon which the consumer relies.' Therefore, justice demands
that when the purchaser is damaged by reason of his reliance on false
facts, then the manufacturer must not be able to deny liability on the
absence of technical privity of contract. These cases indicate it would
be unreasonable to limit a consumer's protection to only the warranties
made directly to the consumer by the immediate retailer, knowing that
the manufacturer influenced the purchaser to purchase the defective
product. The recent holdings are evidence that the realities of today re-
quire equal protection for the purchaser from the manufacturer as well as
from the retailer who is in privity of contract with the purchaser. 9 The
rationale for this view is that the manufacturer's warranties are a major
4. With whom Thomas, C.J., Drew, J., Thornal, J., and Barns, J., concur.
5. Wyatt v. Cadillac Motor Car Div., 145 Cal. App. 2d 423, 302 P.2d 665 (1956);
Karl's Stores v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 145 F. Supp. 376 (D. Mass. 1956); Donovan
Const. Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 133 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1955); Seavey, Actions for
Economic Harm, 32 N.Y.UL. REv. 1242 (1957).
6. 201 So. 2d at 443.
7. See Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A.2d 568 (1959), disapproved
in, Miller v. Preitz, 422 Pa. 392, 221 A.2d 320 (1966) ; Sperry Rand Corp. v. Indus. Supply
Corp., 337 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1964); see also Feezer, Manufacturers' Liability for Injuries
Caused by His Products: Defective Automobiles, 37 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1938); Wade,
Strict Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 13 (1965).
8. W. PROSSER, TORTs § 511 (2d ed. 1955).
9. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69
YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
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inducement for the buyer to make the purchase. This problem has also
been under discussion in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS.
Manufacturers' libality is treated by the American Law Institute in
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402B (1965). Section 402B deals
only with physical loss and reads as follows:
One engaged in the business of selling chattels who, by ad-
vertising, labels, or otherwise, makes to the public a misrep-
resentation of material fact concerning the character or quality
of a chattel sold by him is subject to liability for physical harm
to a consumer of the chattel caused by justifiable reliance upon
the misrepresentation, even though
(a) it is not made fraudulently or negligently, and
(b) the consumer has not bought the chattel from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller. (Emphasis added.)
Section 402B deals only with "physical harm" but it is stated in comment
a following § 402B that a parallel rule, as to strict liability for "pecuniary
loss" resulting from such a misrepresentation, is to be contained in a
proposed § 552D. A tentative draft of the proposed § 552D and the
comment dealing with pecuniary loss is as follows:
One engaged in the business of selling chattels who, by ad-
vertising, labels or otherwise, makes to the public a misrepre-
sentation of a material fact concerning the character or quality
of a chattel sold by him is subject to liability for pecuniary loss
caused to another by his purchase of the chattel in justifiable
reliance upon misrepresentation, even though it is not made
fraudulently or negligently.
Comment:
a. This Section parrallels § 402B, which states the rule as to
strict liability for physical harm to a user or consumer of the
chattel, where the seller makes a misrepresentation to the
public concerning its character or quality. This Section states
the same rule, as to liability for pecuniary loss, caused to one
who purchases the chattel in justifiable reliance on the misrepre-
sentation. The Comments under § 402B are pertinent.
It should be noted that § 552D applies only to misrepresentations of
material facts and not to mere "sales talk," sometimes called "puffing."'"
The court in the instant case does not give effect to the provision in
the warranty excluding an implied warranty of fitness between the
manufacturer and retailer since such warranty of fitness is implied by
law." The court reasoned that the manufacturer could not preclude a
finding of an implied in law warranty by a mere disclaimer. 2
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402B, comment g (1965).
11. Posey v. Pensacola Tractor & Equip. Co., 138 So. 2d 777 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
12. Hoskins v. Jackson Grain Co., 63 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 1953); McDonald v. Sanders,
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Professor Williston 3 and other writers 4 throughout the United States
are in agreement as to discarding the defense of privity of contract, and
holding the manufacturers strictly accountable for the truthfulness of
representations made to the public and relied upon by the purchaser.
It is submitted that progressive courts must realize that advertisements
are greatly relied upon by the ordinary purchaser and consequently, the
manufacturers must be held accountable for the truthfulness of the
advertisements. The ordinary buyer can not be expected to have the
engineering experience or opportunity to make adequate investigations of
modern products and, therefore, must rely greatly upon the manufac-
turers' representations as to the fitness and suitability of the goods.
David J. Kozma
WILLS-STOCK SPLIT-LEGATEE TAKES EXACT NUMBER OF SHARES
BEQUEATHED-A testatrix's bequest of a specified number of stock shares
which split after she made her will but before she died was held effective
to pass only the exact number bequeathed and not the total number owned
at death.
Greathead Estate, 428 Pa. 553, 236 A.2d 224 (1967), rehearing denied,
236 A.2d 224 (1968).
Testatrix, who owned 2400 shares of Smith, Kline & French' stock at
the writing of her will completely disposed of these shares in 100 and 200
share bequests; her will provided in part, "I give and bequeath 200 shares
of my Smith, Kline & French stock to St. Giles Church."' Purchases and
sales by her which occurred after the writing of the will had reduced to
2000 the number of shares owned when the SKF split 3 for 1. Shortly
after this split testatrix died-without having changed her will. Appellant,
St. Giles Church, claimed the increased number of shares resulting from
the split, arguing that testatrix had indicated an intent to dispose of those
particular shares of stock owned at the making of her will by the simple
expedient of completely disposing of all 2400 shares. Thus, under appel-
103 Fla. 93, 137 So. 122 (1931); Sperry Rand Corp. v. Indus. Supply Corp., 337 F.2d 363
(5th Cir. 1964) ; Goodrich Co. v. Hamond, 269 F.2d 501 (10th Cir. 1959) ; Spence v. Three
Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958); Henningsen
v. Bloomfield Motor Co., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
13. 1 S. WILLISTON, SALES § 2449 (rev. ed. 1948).
14. Feezer, Manfacturers' Liability for Injuries Caused by Products, 37 MIcH. L. REv.
1 (1938); Holdridge, Advertised-Product Liability, 8 CLEv.-MAR. L. REV. 14 (1959); Noel,
Manufacturers of Products-The Drift Toward Strict Liability, 24 TENN. L. REV. 963 (1957).
1. Hereinafter referred to as SKF.
2. Greathead Estate, 236 A.2d 224, 428 Pa. 553, 556 (1967), rehearing denied 236 A.2d
224 (1968).
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